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1. Introduction 
Business fixed investment in manufacturing constitutes a sizeable component of 
total demand and therefore exerts a significant impact on economic activity. In addition, 
apart from its contemporaneous effect on the level of income, it also exerts a longer-
lasting effect, since it directly impacts on the future production capabilities of 
manufacturing. Thus, studying various aspects of the underlying investment decision 
making process is of paramount importance both for academics and policy makers.  
For these reasons the Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the Commission of the European Communities conducts a survey where managers state 
their plans about future investment, which the European Commission then uses for 
multiple purposes such as forecasting output growth and employment in Euroland. In 
other words, managers state their expectations regarding future investment and 
essentially provide a quantitative forecast. It is apparent that the quality of the survey 
responses will ultimately affect their usefulness for policy making decisions. Although 
planned investment will probably differ from actual investment, one expects that 
differences will be random. This forecast would be valuable to the extent that it contains 
significant predictive power over future investment. Moreover, having obtained direct 
observations on investment plans, it is possible to investigate empirically the nature of 
expectations formation. 
Thus, in this study we mainly focus on two issues. First, test whether the 
particular survey-based expectations are compatible with rationality. Second, in the event 
rationality is rejected, explore the properties of the expectations formation mechanism.      
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature on testing Rational Expectations. Section 3 describes the dataset 
used in our analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology adopted. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Finally, major findings are summarised in Section 6.    
2. Testing Rational Expectations: A Brief Literature 
Review   
The introduction of the notion of Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH, 
hereafter) by Muth (1961) and its further development by Lucas (1972), and Sargent and 
Wallace (1976) has produced a so-called revolution in economics as a science, which has 
dramatically altered the way economic modelling is done as well as policy is conducted 
(Goodwin and Sheffrin, 1982; Pesaran, 1987; Keane and Runkle, 1990, 1993; Dominitz 
and Manski, 1997). Early studies investigated whether forecast errors possessed 
properties that were compatible with rationality, as an indirect way of testing the validity 
of REH (Mullineux, 1978).  
A major drawback of testing the REH is that it is very often based on ex post 
observed data, which are then used to form forecast (expectation) errors. For this reason, 
there is a growing literature that tests the REH using survey data, which by definition 
correspond to agents’ stated expectations. Thus, directly observing market participants 
expectations allows the econometrician to assess their rationality, and in cases the 
expectations are quantitative rather than qualitative, to also study the evolution of 
expectations. The forecasting accuracy, predictive content and rationality of survey-based 
expectations are of paramount importance in various markets.  
A number of studies have found expectations to contain useful information and in 
general conclude that macroeconomic models perform better when survey-based 
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expectations are utilised instead of model-constructed rational expectations (Batchelor, 
1986; Lee, 1994; Holden and Thompson, 1997; Lee and Shields, 2000; Smith and 
McAleer, 1995; Roberts, 1995, 1997; Mankiw and Reis, 2001).  Madsen (1996), Thomas 
(1999), and Mehra (2002) consider the issue of formation of inflation expectations and its 
implications for the efficiency of macroeconomic policy. The rationality of participants in 
the foreign exchange market, and its implications for exchange rate behaviour and 
management has also been a prominent application (Tagaki, 1991; Ito, 1994; 
Sobiechowski, 1996; Dutt and Ghosh, 1997; Suk-Joong, 1997; Moosa and Shamsuddin, 
2004). Finally, the rationality of participants in financial markets has also attracted 
considerable attention (Fraser and MacDonald, 1993; Pieroni and Ricciarelli, 2005). 
Considerable amount of research effort has also been committed on testing whether 
income expectations predict future income, in the context of micro-level data studies 
(Flavin, 1991; Dominitz, 1993; Alessie and Lusardi, 1997; Das and Van Soest, 1999; 
Delorme et al, 2001). Finally, an extensive literature focuses on the efficiency of betting 
markets by testing the rationality of market participants’ in forecasting (Gray and Gray, 
1997; Boulier, et al, 2006).        
3. Data Description and Definitions of Variables   
We utilise data from the Investment Survey (part of Business Surveys)
conducted twice a year by the European Commission Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs. The survey covers a wide range of industrial sectors 
and firms of various sizes (in terms of number of employees). Our sample covers the 
1985-2003 periods and includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
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Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.
Basically, a questionnaire is sent to managers twice a year in order to provide 
information regarding their current and planned (fixed) investment decisions. In 
particular, the first survey is conducted on March/April, while the second on 
October/November and respondents answer the following questions: 
 
The timing of responses is crucial in this context since it affects the time horizon 
(span) of responses as well as their nature (backward or forward looking). The 
October/November Q1 is clearly backward-looking since respondents, at about the end of 
the fiscal year, state the percentage change of investment relative to last year. Responses 
on this question are used in our analysis as the (reported) realised change in investment, 
and are denoted as: ( )itI , where  and i stand for the first-difference operator and 
country index respectively. More formally, ( ) 1i i it t tI I I  =  , evaluated on 
October/November of year ( )t .
March/April Investment Survey  
• March/April Q1: State percentage change in investment last year ( )1t  on 
investment two years ago ( )2t  .
• March/April Q2: State percentage change in investment this year ( )t on 
investment last year ( )1t  .
October/November Investment Survey  
• October/November Q1: State percentage change in investment this year 
( )t on investment last year ( )1t  .
• October/November Q2: State percentage change in investment next year 
( )1t + on investment this year ( )t .
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Given the structure of the survey, one may device two alternative conditional 
forecasts for ( )itI based on information available prior to ( )t . The first is based on 
responses to the October/November Q2, where respondents are asked to state their 
investment plans for the coming year. Let us call this forecast ,11,
i
t tF  , which utilises 
responses on this question from the year prior to ( )t . The second forecast, call it ,2,it tF% for 
symmetry, is based on responses to the March/April Q2, where respondents are asked to 
state their planned investment the year ( )t relative to year ( )1t  . Notice that we denote 
conditioning on t% in order to emphasize that although responses are given in year ( )t ,
this is done when only three months of this year have elapsed.  
The two alternative forecasts, ,11,
i
t tF  and 
,2
,
i
t tF% , differ in terms of timing. The first is 
an expectation for investment growth (change) in year ( )t , which is formed 3 months 
before year ( )1t  has ended. The second is an expectation for investment growth in year 
( )t , which is formed 3 months into year ( )t . Thus, ,2,it tF% should be a more accurate 
forecast in comparison to ,11,
i
t tF  since the former is based on a superior information set.  
Graphs 1 and 2 offer a pictorial representation of the direction of movements 
between expectations and actual (as reported) investment changes.  
[Graphs 1 & 2] 
Both expectations measures exhibit a strong positive relationship with actual 
investment change, providing informal evidence that each one of them contains some 
explanatory power over actual investment growth. Note that ,2,
i
t tF% tends to be more 
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accurate as indicated by (i) the steepness of the scatter diagram, and (ii) the smaller 
dispersion.  
We also constructed the scatter diagram between the two forecast measures, 
provided below. 
[Graph 3] 
The two conditional expectations are very closely linked, as expected, and their 
scatter diagram almost coincides with the 450 line. Any deviations from the unit-slope 
curve may primarily be attributed to the asynchronous timing in forming these 
expectations and therefore, reflect differences in the information sets.        
4. Empirical Methodology and Testable Hypotheses 
4.1 Efficiency of Expectations 
One interpretation of rationality of expectations is that survey measures are 
unbiased forecasts of actual future outcomes. Under rational expectations, the 
unbiasedness hypotheses are given by:  
( ),11, 1i it t t tF E I  	 
=   (1)
and  
( ),2,i itt t tF E I	 
=  % %  (2)
Where ( )E • is the conditional expectations operator. These relationships state that the 
expectations’ formation mechanism at any point in time produces forecasts equal to the 
expected value of the underlying variable of interest. Linking now ex ante formed 
expectations with ex post observed outcomes produces the following relationships: 
( ) ,1 ,11,i i it t t tI F  = +  (3)
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and 
( ) ,2 ,2,i i it tt tI F  = +% (4)
where ' s are the expectations' forecast errors and under rational expectations should, at 
least, satisfy the following properties (Sheffrin, 1983): ( ),1 0i jtE  = and 
( ), ,1 0i j i jt t k tE   + = 0k  .
The unbiasedness of survey measures can be tested in a simple regression 
framework, where the observed outcome is the dependent variable and the conditional 
forecast measure is the explanatory variable: 
( ) ( ),1 ,11 1 1,i i i it t t tI F u   = + +  (5)
and  
( ) ( ),2 ,22 2 ,i i i it tt tI F u  = + +% (6)
Where 'u s are white noise disturbance terms.    
Under the null hypothesis of unbiasedness a set of restrictions are imposed on the 
parameters of the above regressions as follows (Lovell, 1986; Bernheim, 1990): 
0 1 1: 0 1H  =  = , and 0 2 2: 0 1H  =  = .
Rejection of these hypotheses would provide prima facie evidence against the 
unbiasedness hypothesis and consequently against rationality.  
4.2 Evolution and Formation of Expectations 
By exploiting the different timing of forming the two forecasts, one may test some 
further fruitful hypotheses regarding the evolution of expectations. In particular, using the 
law of iterated expectations, the two expectations formed should differ by the amount of 
any information that became available between ( )1,  t t % :
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( ),2 ,11,, 1,i it tt t t tF F  = +% % (7)
Any differences between the two forecasts may only be attributed to the ‘arrival 
of news’. Hence, if expectations were rational, then any revisions or changes in them 
should be uncorrelated with all previously available information. The difference between 
expectations is essentially a revision of expectations, and should reflect the arrival of new 
information and by default should be non-autocorrelated and furthermore should be 
orthogonal to any member of the information set 1t . Let us denote the revision process 
as follows: 
,2 ,1
1,, 1 ,
i i i
t tt t t tREV F F  = % %  (8)
Rationality of expectations can also be tested using the properties of the revision 
process. In particular, current revision should be unrelated to past revisions. Thus, the 
slope parameters of the following model should be jointly equal to zero: 
( ) ( )1 2, 1 1, 2 2, 2i i i ii tt t t t t tREV REV REV       = + + +% % %  (9)
While the above analysis allows us to comment on the nature and the efficiency of 
expectations it is not informative about how the expectations are formed. In order to find 
the type of expectation formation mechanism that underlies the evolution of expectations, 
assume first that expected changes in investment are a weighted average of the current 
change in investment and some other element, tx :
( ) ( ) ( ),2 1 1, 1i it tt tF w x w I= +  % (10)
Where 1w is a weighting factor.   
If 1 0w = then (10) would describe static expectations. Having (10) as a starting point we 
may consider two alternative expectation mechanisms.  
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First, Regressive Expectations, where tx g= , and g denotes the sample mean of 
( )itI . Regressive Expectations imply that agents adjust their expectations a certain 
fraction of last year’s deviation from the distribution mean of the underlying variable. In 
other words, agents believe that the variable of interest will tend to move towards its 
mean. Then one may reparameterise (10) as: 
( ) ( ),2 ,2 ,2 *1, 1, 1 ,i i i itt t t t t t tF F F g I u   	 
   =  + % % % % (11)
Where  *tu% is a white noise error term and  is an estimable parameter that measures the 
rate of adjustment to deviations from the mean, which is expected to lie in the ( )0,1
interval.  
Second, Adaptive Expectations, according to which agents adjust their 
expectations a certain fraction of last year’s expectation error. Hence, tx =
,2
1, 1
i
t tF  % , which 
when substituted into (10) produces:  
( ) ( ),2 ,2 ,2 ,2 **1, 1, 1 , 1, 1i i i i itt t t t t t t t tF F F F I u    	 
   =  + % % % % % (12)
Where  **tu% is a white noise error term and  is an estimable parameter that measures the 
rate of adjustment to last period’s expectation error, which is expected to lie in the 
( )1,0 interval.   
5. Empirical Results 
We estimate the parameters of equations (5) and (6) in a panel framework, which 
will allow us to exploit variation both cross-sectionally (across countries) as well as time. 
Estimation is conducted applying Fixed and Random Effects, and including a set of year 
dummies in order to allow for time heterogeneity. The choice between Fixed and 
Page 9 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Random Effects is based on the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). In particular, significant 
values of the test qualify the Fixed Effects estimator. The relevant estimation results are 
reported in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
For both cases the preferred specification is given by Fixed Effects. Both forecast 
measures explain a statistically significant portion of the variation in actual investment 
growth. Furthermore, both slope parameters are positive suggesting that both forecast 
measures correctly predict the direction of movement. In addition, the second forecast 
measure accounts for 60 percent of actual investment growth’s variation while the first 
forecast measure explains 49 percent. The difference, as discussed earlier, is attributed to 
the fact that the second forecast measure is based on a superior information set and 
consequently constitutes a more accurate forecast. Notice that the slope parameter 
associated with the second forecast measure is larger and closer to unity (0.58) than that 
obtained from the first forecast measure (0.48), although both are statistically different 
from unity, which enables the rejection of efficiency (unbiasedness) of expectations. 
Overall, our findings indicate that expectations, on average, predict accurately the 
direction of movement in investment growth and furthermore contain significant 
explanatory power over its variation. However, strictly speaking efficiency (rationality) is 
rejected since expectations do not represent unbiased predictors of investment growth.  
We now turn our attention to the evolution of expectations and in particular focus 
on the orthogonality conditions regarding expectation revisions. As discussed earlier, 
revisions of expectations should be uncorrelated with any member of the information set 
that was know at the time of expectation formation. The simplest orthogonality test one 
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may perform is to investigate whether expectations revisions’ behaviour exhibits any 
autoregressiveness. This is one by employing equation (9) whose estimated parameters 
are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
Again the Fixed Effects estimator is in order. The AR(2) model explains an 
insignificant 5 % of the variation in revisions and furthermore we were able to reject that 
revisions show any first-order autocorrelation. In contrast, highly significant second-
order dependence is uncovered, with the relevant coefficient carrying a negative sign. In 
other words, the orthogonality condition fails providing us with further evidence against 
rationality of expectations.  
We proceed by exploring the process that more adequately describes the 
expectation formation mechanism. In particular, we consider two competing 
specifications; Regressive Expectations and Adaptive Expectations whose performance is 
assessed by the means of estimating equations (11) and (12) respectively. The relevant 
results are summarised in Table 4. 
[Table 4] 
Based on the Fixed Effects estimation results, we observe that both estimated 
slope parameters are consistent with their a priori expected signs. In particular, the slope 
parameter associated with the Regressive Expectations is positive, suggesting that when 
last period’s actual investment growth was above (below) its average, agents expect that 
in the current period it will move downwards (upwards), showing a tendency to approach 
its mean value. Similarly, the parameter of the Adaptive Expectations is negative, 
indicating that if in the last period agents had overestimated (underestimated) the actual 
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investment growth they will adjust downwards (upwards) their expectations for the 
current period. As far as the speeds of adjustment (i.e. the slope parameters) are 
concerned, under the validity of Regressive Expectations agents are found to ‘clear’ 
about 90 percent of the observed ‘disequilibrium’, while under Adaptive Expectations 
only 53 percent is ‘cleared’. In addition, we also tested whether the speed of adjustment 
parameters, as estimated, (i) are indeed different from zero and therefore non-trivial, and 
(ii) are significantly different from their maximum theoretical values (+1 for Regressive 
Expectations and -1 for Adaptive Expectations). The null of zero (trivial) speed of 
adjustment was emphatically rejected for both cases, while we were not able to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficient associated with Regressive Expectations is equal to unity, 
and therefore represents full adjustment within a single period. Finally, both equations 
explain a significant part of expectations’ formation, although the Regressive 
Expectations mechanism exhibits almost double explanatory power when compared to 
the Adaptive Expectations. All in all, our results qualify the Regressive Expectations as 
the mechanism that more adequately describes the behaviour of expectations’ formation.        
6. Conclusion 
According to our findings expectations predict accurately the direction of 
movement in investment growth and furthermore, contain significant explanatory power 
over its variation. However, strictly speaking efficiency (rationality) is rejected since 
expectations do not represent unbiased predictors of investment growth. As far as the 
evolution of expectations is concerned, we report highly significant second-order 
dependence which provides further evidence against rationality of expectations. Finally, 
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our results qualify Regressive Expectations as the mechanism that more adequately 
describes the formation of expectations.     
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Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Sample Correlations 
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Actual 4.53 12.82 -30 51
Forecast-1 8.24 13.65 -17 94
Forecast-2 10.00 14.36 -31 77
Revision 1.20 8.99 -28 26
Sample Correlations 
Actual Forecast-1 Forecast-2 
Actual 1.00
Forecast-1 0.56 1.00
Forecast-2 0.69 0.79 1.00
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Table 2 Testing Efficiency of Expectations (Panel estimation, with time dummies) 
Forecast-1 Forecast-2 
Coefficient
(standard error)
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
 15.89
(3.10)***
0.67
(3.19)
-0.60
(2.45)
-0.266
(2.58)
 0.485***
(0.056)
0.398***
(0.052)
0.580***
(0.046)
0.537***
(0.044)
Diagnostics
2R 49 % 50 % 60 % 61 %
Wald test 13.51*** 231.30*** 21.97*** 375.01***
Hausman test 15.79*** 32.77***
Hypotheses testing
0 : 1H  = 81.96
*** 130.54*** 81.76*** 107.78***
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis denote heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. The 
hypothesis is tested using applying a chi-square test. One, two or three asterisks denote 
significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level respectively. 2R  stands for the coefficient of 
determination. Hausman denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its significance qualifies 
the Fixed Effects estimator as the appropriate model.      
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Table 3 AR(2) model for Expectations Revisions (Panel estimation, with time 
dummies)
Coefficient
(standard error)
Fixed Effects Random Effects
1 0.029(0.075)
0.265***
(0.075)
2 -0.251
***
(0.079)
-0.031
(0.08)
Diagnostics
2R 5 % 15 %
Wald test 1.83 29.80***
Hausman test 66.14***
Hypothesis testing 
0 1: 0H  = 0.15 12.31
***
0 2: 0H  = 10.00
*** 0.16
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis denote heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. The 
hypothesis is tested using applying a chi-square test. One, two or three asterisks denote 
significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level respectively. 2R  stands for the coefficient of 
determination. Hausman denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its significance qualifies 
the Fixed Effects estimator as the appropriate model.  
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Table 4 Expectation Formation Mechanisms (Panel estimation, with time dummies)
Regressive 
expectations
Adaptive expectations
Coefficient
(standard error)
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
Fixed 
Effects
Random 
Effects
 0.908***
(0.097)
0.808***
(0.092)
- -
 - - -0.530***
(0.132)
-0.381***
(0.105) 
Diagnostics
2R 44 % 44 % 26 % 26 %
Wald test 9.29*** 148.20*** 4.01*** 67.49***
Hausman test 3.88** 5.94**
Hypothesis testing
0 : 0H  = 86.55
***
-
0 : 0H  = - 16.14
***
0 : 1H  = + 0.88 -
0 : 1H  =  - 12.60
***
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis denote heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors. The 
hypothesis is tested using applying a chi-square test. One, two or three asterisks denote 
significance at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level respectively. 2R  stands for the coefficient of 
determination. Hausman denotes the Hausman (1978) test and its significance qualifies 
the Fixed Effects estimator as the appropriate model.  
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Graphs 
 
Graph 1 Reported Investment Change (Actual) vs. Forecasted (Measure 1), Scatter 
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Graph 2 Reported Investment Change (Actual) vs. Forecasted (Measure 2), Scatter 
Diagram 
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Graph 3 Forecasted Investment Change (Measure 1) vs. Forecasted Investment 
Change (Measure 1) Scatter Diagram 
-5
0
0
50
10
0
Fo
re
ca
st
ed
In
ve
st
m
en
tC
ha
ng
e
(2
)
-50 0 50 100
Forecasted Investment Change  (1)
Page 25 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
